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abstraCt
In the aftermath of  the 2008 crisis, emerging powers engaged in political 
and legal strategies to challenge the actual framework for global moneta-
ry governance. This article examines two categories of  monetary strategies 
designed as “voice” and “exit” plans (Hirschman 1970). In the case of  the 
former, they aimed at gaining more participation inside the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). In the latter case, strategies were built as legal al-
ternatives to manage future liquidity crises outside the current framework. 
Using this theoretical classification, this paper identifies institutional respon-
ses formulated by the G20 emerging powers in Asia and Latin America after 
2008 crisis. The specific approach proposed by this article is to analyze how 
the legal framework for the management of  international money influences 
their strategies’ designs and outcomes. Up to the present, it seems voice 
strategies are promoting only incremental modifications in institutions. Exit 
strategies, however, have the potential to be  more successful. These strate-
gies have been built as a network of  bilateral swap contracts between central 
banks. Asian powers are more engaged in this type of  legal strategy. La-
tin American countries tend to be recipients of  these plans. Exit strategies, 
however, are moving multilateral cooperation away from the IMF, reinfor-
cing institutional fragmentation and uncertainty on how the next liquidity 
crises would be managed.
Keywords: international monetary system, international monetary architec-
ture, International Monetary Fund (IMF), international money, central bank 
swap contracts.
resumo 
No pós-crise de 2008, países emergentes formularam estratégias jurídicas 
e políticas para contestar o atual arcabouço institucional da governança mo-
netária global. Este artigo examina duas categorias de estratégias monetárias, 
identificadas como planos de “voz” e de “saída” (Hirschman 1970). Em 
relação às primeiras, o objetivo era alcançar maior participação no âmbito 
do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI). Quanto às segundas, as estraté-
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gias foram construídas como alternativas jurídicas para 
a gestão de futuras crises de liquidez, fora do marco 
vigente. Valendo-se dessa classificação teórica de Hirs-
chman, este artigo identifica as respostas institucionais 
formuladas pelos países emergentes da América Latina 
e da Ásia, membros do G-20, após a crise de 2008. A 
abordagem específica proposta por este artigo consiste 
em analisar como o arcabouço jurídico para a gestão 
monetária internacional influencia o desenho de suas es-
tratégias e de seus resultados. Até o presente, percebe-se 
que as estratégias de voz estão promovendo apenas mo-
dificações incrementais nas instituições. As estratégias 
de saída, por outro lado, têm maior potencial de êxito. 
Tais planos têm se apoiado em uma rede de contratos 
bilaterais de swap de moeda entre bancos centrais. As 
potências asiáticas têm se empenhado mais ativamente 
nesse tipo de estratégia jurídica. Os países latino-ame-
ricanos, por sua vez, tendem a figurar na posição de 
receptores. As estratégias de saída estão, contudo, afas-
tando a cooperação multilateral do FMI, reforçando a 
fragmentação institucional global e as incertezas sobre 
como será implementada a gestão de uma próxima crise 
de liquidez.
Palavras-chave: sistema monetário internacional, ar-
quitetura monetária internacional, Fundo Monetário 
Internacional (FMI), moeda internacional, contratos de 
swap de moedas entre bancos centrais.
1. introduCtion
The global financial architecture has been stable sin-
ce the end of  World War II and the establishment of  
the Bretton Woods institutions.1 Since its creation, the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) responsibilities 
on monetary governance evolved along with significant 
changes in the international financial system.2 Howe-
1  The single exception was the creation of  the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB). The FSB has its headquarters at the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland.
2  For a critical and special account on the history of  international 
monetary cooperation, see  James, H. (1996) International Mon-
etary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. For the history of  the IMF, see Boughton, J. M. (2001) 
Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund, 1979– 1989, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.; De Vries, M. G., 
Horsefield, J.K. (1969) The International Monetary Fund, 1945- 
1965: Twenty Years of  International Monetary Cooperation, Vol-
ume II: Analysis, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.; 
De Vries, M. G. (1976) The International Monetary Fund, 1966-
ver, it has maintained its governance structure relatively 
constant with the predominance of  traditional powers 
in the decision-making process and a special role assig-
ned to the United States and its currency.
In the last three decades, however, a major shift in 
global economic power has occurred, but governance 
structures in the monetary field did not adjust accordin-
gly. The share in global GDP (PPP basis)3 for advanced 
economies changed from more than 58% in 1992 to ap-
proximately 43% in 2014. In the same period, the share 
for emerging and developing countries increased from 
41% to 57%, respectively, and it is expected to be more 
than 60% in 2020.4 Nevertheless, emerging and develo-
ping economies’ share in the IMF quotas only changed 
(and after long periods of  negotiations) from 36% in 
1992 to 42.4% in 2016.
In the post-2008 crisis, the emerging countries in the 
Group of  20 (G20)5 called for changes in the balance 
of  voting power at the Fund, arguing that  the IMF’s 
decisions would be more legitimate and efficient in res-
ponding to emerging needs of  monetary cooperation.6 
There is a demand for more participation and represen-
tation in international institutions to better reflect the 
global shift of  economic power.
This article focuses on the fundamental changes that 
happened within monetary governance at the global 
1971: The System Under Stress, Volume I: Narrative, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington DC. and De Vries, M. G. (1985) The 
International Monetary Fund, 1972-1978, Volume I: Narrative and 
Analysis, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
3  PPP means Purchasing Power Parity.
4  Source: IMF statistics. 
5  The G20 is an informal network created in 1999, after the 
Asian and Latin American liquidity crises. It became an important 
forum for global governance when an inaugural leaders’ summit in 
2008 brought together the head of  states and governments of  these 
countries. See the Communiqués of  London and Seoul Summits at: 
https://www.g20.org
6  In 2009, the G20 communiqué of  the London Summit regis-
tered that: “[i]n order for our financial institutions to help manage 
the crisis and prevent future crises we must strengthen their longer 
term relevance, effectiveness and legitimacy. So alongside the signifi-
cant increase in resources agreed today we are determined to reform 
and modernise the international financial institutions to ensure they 
can assist members and shareholders effectively in the new challeng-
es they face. We will reform their mandates, scope and governance 
to reflect changes in the world economy and the new challenges of  
globalisation, and that emerging and developing economies, includ-
ing the poorest, must have greater voice and representation. This 
must be accompanied by action to increase the credibility and ac-
countability of  the institutions through better strategic oversight 
and decision making” (item 20, G20 London Summit – Leaders’ 
Statement 2 April 2009).
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level, notably involving the IMF. The goal is to stress 
the modifications on institutional arrangements in the 
aftermath of  the 2008 crisis and identify how the emer-
ging powers in Asia and Latin America are formulating 
their “voice” and “exit” strategies.7 This theoretical 
framework is helpful to describe two kinds of  mone-
tary actions, which emerging countries are adopting in 
relation to global monetary governance: (1) member 
countries are expressing their dissatisfaction with the 
management of  monetary affairs at the Fund (voice 
option); and (2) some member countries are pursuing 
other institutional arrangements, with the same func-
tions of  the IMF, to promote monetary cooperation at 
the international level (exit option).
In the case of  monetary governance, up to the pre-
sent, there is no decline in the Fund’s membership, as the 
traditional framework of  Albert O. Hirschman would 
suggest. However, this theoretical approach allows us 
to investigate how voice and exit options come into play 
jointly and interact with each other, reinforcing them-
selves in particular situations related to the management 
of  international money and to the legal design of  its 
framework.
Voice and exit strategies are creating an impact on 
global monetary architecture and reinforcing institutio-
nal fragmentation through the emergence of  a network 
of  bilateral and regional arrangements based on curren-
cy swaps8 among central banks. In this sense, the com-
bination of  voice and exit monetary strategies could be 
described as “contested multilateralism”.9 
This concept emphasizes that “contemporary multi-
lateralism is characterized by competing coalitions and 
shifting institutional arrangements, informal as well as 
formal”.10 The main institutional innovation for mone-
tary governance is the creation of  bilateral and regional 
arrangements based on currency swaps, which have a 
multilateral intent: to promote monetary cooperation 
at the global level. There is a difference, however: the 
7  HIRSCHMAN, A. O. Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to de-
cline in firms, organizations, and states. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1970.
8  In a currency swap agreement, a central bank swaps its own 
currency for another (usually, a stronger currency) and assumes the 
obligation of  repurchasing its currency on a later date at a predeter-
mined rate.
9  Morse, J. C., Keohane, R. O. (2014) “Contested Multilateral-
ism”. The Review of  International Organizations 9.4.
10  MORSE, J. C., KEOHANE, R. O. Contested Multilateral-
ism…, 2014, p. 386 (note 10, above).
cooperation is based on central banks’ actions - and not 
on international organizations’ arrangements. This is an 
important change in terms of  institutional design of  in-
ternational monetary governance with the emergence 
of  other types of  formal agreements.
Therefore, I am testing the arguments of  Morse and 
Keohane11 in relation to global monetary governance. 
Legal rules and institutions created after the 2008 cri-
sis, notably by what I called exit strategies, challenged 
the current global monetary order in two ways: by chal-
lenging the IMF as a central organization for moneta-
ry cooperation and by challenging the US dollar as the 
key currency for the Bretton Woods system. Emerging 
powers, especially in Asia, are promoting actions of  
“competitive regime creation”12, i.e. a “coalition of  dis-
satisfied actors” is creating new arrangements for multi-
lateral cooperation to challenge the existing institutional 
status quo, since the IMF’s progress has been slow in ex-
panding its political legitimacy and economic efficiency.
The main findings of  this article are: (1) after the 
2008 crisis, emerging powers in Latin America and Asia 
combined voice and exit strategies to challenge the ac-
tual legal framework for monetary governance; (2) voice 
strategies were focused on changes of  the IMF power 
structure and were constructed in two forms: the G20 
calls for a quota increase and shifts in voting power at 
the Fund, as well as proposals to reinforce the role of  
the SDR (Special Drawing Rights) as an international 
reserve asset;13 and (3) exit strategies involved the es-
tablishment or the reinforcement of  parallel monetary 
institutions through bilateral and regional agreements, 
as well as the promotion of  new global currencies to 
challenge the US dollar’s hegemony as the key curren-
cy of  the Bretton Woods system (e.g. bilateral currency 
swaps between central banks and pooling of  foreign ex-
change reserves).
Up to the present, these strategies seem to have had 
only an incremental impact on the legal design of  the 
global financial architecture. Voice strategies had a de-
ferred and incomplete victory due to institutional iner-
11  MORSE, J. C., KEOHANE, R. O. Contested Multilateral-
ism…, 2014 (note 10, above).
12  MORSE, J. C., KEOHANE, R. O. Contested Multilateral-
ism…, 2014 (note 10, above).
13  The SDR was created in 1969. It is an international asset allo-
cated by the IMF among all the SDR Department’s participants. For 
details on the functioning of  the SDR, see LASTRA, R. M. Inter-
national and financial law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015.
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tia. Only 5.7% of  the Fund’s voting power was allo-
cated to emerging countries. Five years was needed to 
accomplish this movement due to the hostility of  the 
U.S. Congress in confirming the quota increase. Never-
theless, the United States remains with veto power over 
key decisions at the Fund, retaining 16.5% of   the vo-
ting share.
In 2015, the Chinese currency, the Renminbi, was 
included in the IMF’s SDR basket of  currencies. This 
decision took effect in October 2016. This asset, howe-
ver, has minor practical relevance in the global moneta-
ry system, representing less than 3.2% of  international 
reserves.14 Yet it can produce a symbolic effect: it could 
reinforce the emergence of  alternatives to the US dollar 
as the main currency of  the Bretton Woods system (a 
type of  exit strategy).
Exit strategies have been relatively more successful. 
In fact, a type of  monetary strategy viable in a global 
system of  national monies, without capital controls, is 
the State ability and economic capacity of  issuing a na-
tional currency accepted as global means of  payment 
and vehicle for investments. The inclusion of  the Ren-
minbi in the IMF’s SDR basket may be mainly symbolic 
as a voice strategy, but it reveals a path to the emergence 
of  new global currencies.
 Nonetheless, exit strategies are producing important 
consequences for the international economic architec-
ture. They are reinforcing institutional fragmentation of  
the monetary system: fewer multilateral organizations, 
more flexible contracts at the regional and bilateral le-
vels. As a consequence, they are contributing to adding 
more uncertainty to the handling of  the next liquidity 
crises, since cooperation is based on central bank dis-
cretion rather than on international organizations with 
specific mandates at the global level.
Moreover, monetary structures based on exit strate-
gies are not horizontal, as one might believe. Regional 
and bilateral agreements in the monetary field have a 
hierarchical component due to the hegemony of  certain 
currencies in the global financial system. This hierarchi-
cal component reproduces an essential characteristic of  
international money15: monetary orders are hierarchical 
14  IMF-related assets (SDR holdings and reserve tranche) ac-
counted for 3.4 percent of  total international reserves at the end 
of  2013 (Source: IMF - https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
ar/2014/eng/pdf/a1.pdf)
15  BERNES, T. A., Jenkins, P., Mehrling, P., Neilson, D. China’s 
and tend to continue to be so in the medium-term, even 
if  emerging currencies could challenge the U.S. dollar’s 
key role.
My analysis of  exit strategies provides a different 
conclusion if  compared to Armijo and Katada’s16 in-
vestigation on the emerging powers’ “financial state-
craft”. They argued that emerging economies’ financial 
strategies “to date remain primarily defensive, aiming 
at participation rather than transformation of  the exis-
ting international market and regulatory system”.17 I ar-
gue, in fact, that exit strategies already implemented by 
emerging powers have the potential to be successful in 
the medium and long-term, notably in Asia. Their fi-
nancial strategies are based on very particular monetary 
knowledge: what the functions of  international money 
are and how emerging countries’ governments could 
effectively intervene in this regulatory and market en-
vironment - mainly, through central bank interventions 
and swaps.
To better evaluate exit and voice strategies, I pro-
pose to examine them from the perspective of  how 
international money plays its role in the global finan-
cial system and how the US dollar as an international 
currency has evolved since the founding of  the Bret-
ton Woods system. The analysis of  this global system 
based on national currencies is essential to understand 
how the management of  international money impacts 
differently developed and developing countries, issuers 
and “consumers” of  global currencies. It also enables 
the appraisal of  how and why emerging powers are de-
signing their strategies to challenge the Bretton Woods 
framework as exit strategies, while they simultaneously 
express their voice strategies.
In the first section, I present an analysis on the evo-
lution of  the Bretton Woods framework and how the 
US dollar became its key currency. Particularly, I will 
explore what constitutes international money and its 
functions at the global level. In the second section, the 
paper explores the institutional design of  voice and exit 
strategies formulated by emerging powers in Asia and 
engagement with an evolving international monetary system, CIGI 
special report, 2015, p. 5. Available at: <https://www.cigionline.
org/sites/default/files/china_engagement_cigi-inet_special_re-
port_web_0.pdf>. Last accessed: 10 April 2018.
16  ARMIJO, L. E., KATADA, S. N. Theorizing the financial 
statecraft of  emerging powers, New Political Economy 20 (1), 2015. 
17  ARMIJO, L. E., KATADA, S. N. Theorizing the financial…, 
at 58.
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Latin America in the 2008 aftermath. I will stress the 
relationship between the functioning of  international 
money and the emerging monetary structures under-
lying it. I also present some reflections on the practical 
consequences of  emerging countries’ monetary plans, 
notably their impact on the global monetary architectu-
re. A concise conclusion follows.
2. the global finanCial arChiteCture: 
evolving Challenges in managing 
international money
The institutionalization of  monetary cooperation, 
i.e. the enactment of  rules and institutions, provides a 
framework in which economic actors (market and go-
vernment agents) can assure the continued access to in-
ternational money. The global monetary order provides 
international means of  payment (liquidity) and institu-
tions that can address balance of  payment imbalances 
in times of  crisis – i.e., to serve as lender of  last resort. 
In the contemporary world, international money is re-
presented by currencies managed at the national level 
but accepted as monetary standard across boundaries. 
These so-called “hard currencies” serve as vehicles for 
movement of  capital.
The international monetary system is premised on 
hard currencies serving monetary functions at private 
and official levels (Table 1). To be qualified as such, a 
hard currency would be able to be traded in internatio-
nal transactions (medium of  exchange), to be accepted 
for the settlement of  obligations in trade and finance 
(means of  payment), to serve as a denominator of  in-
ternational contracts as well as an anchor in monetary 
systems (unit of  account) and to keep its value stable 
while being perceived as a credible vehicle for invest-
ments (store of  value).
Table 1. Economic and institutional functions of  hard 
currencies
Level / 
Monetary 
Functions
1.  Medium 
of  Exchan-
ge
2. Me-
ans of  
Payment
3. Unit of  
account
4. Store of  
value
1. Private 
use
1.1. Foreign 
exchange 
trading
1.2. Trade 
and finan-
cial settle-
ments
1.3. Deno-
minator for 
financial 
transactions 
and trade 
invoicing
1.4. In-
vestment 
currency
2. Official 
use
2.1. Inter-
vention 
currency 
and object 
of  bilate-
ral swap 
contracts 
between 
central 
banks
2.2. Settle-
ment of  in-
ternational 
obligations
2.3. Exchan-
ge rate 
anchor
2.4. Reserve 
currency 
for central 
banks
Source: based on the foundational work of  Benjamin 
Cohen18 and the author’s reflections on the means of  
payment function (column 2).
In the 1940s, through a treaty agreed upon by states, 
the Bretton Woods system aimed at reorganizing inter-
national monetary architecture.19 Bretton Woods was 
conceived as a system of  “national monies” based on 
control of  capital movements. This agreement establi-
shed the IMF to carry out monetary cooperation. Ini-
tially, the Fund managed the dollar-gold system through 
control on exchange rate parity and, since the 1970s, it 
acts in an even more complex global credit-based sys-
tem. 
Similar to the domestic sphere, the international 
monetary environment is a credit-based system. Sin-
ce its creation in the 1960s, the Eurocurrency market 
has assured the supply of  international private money20, 
18  COHEN, B. J. The geography of  money, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1998. COHEN, B. J. The Future of  Sterling as an 
International Currency, Macmillan: London, 1971.
19  This is a very different framework if  one compares to the 
monetary system during the international gold standard between 
1879 and 1913. The development of  this monetary system was 
based on unilateral actions taken by individual states. However, this 
feature does not imply that the gold standard was not managed, see 
McKinnon, R. The Eurocurrency market, Essays on International 
Finance, n. 125, Princeton University, 1977, pp. 3-10.
20  See: McKinnon, R. Private and official international money: 
the case for the dollar, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. 
;  McKinnon, R. The Eurocurrency market, Essays on International 
Finance, n. 125, Princeton University, 1977; Kindleberger, C In-
ternational money: a collection of  essays, London-Boston: Allen 
& Unwin, 1981, pp. 9-112; CARREAU, D. Le système monétaire 
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a structure that has gained importance with increased 
financial globalization. A Eurocurrency is a currency 
held in a financial institution outside the country of  its 
issuer. The Eurodollar is the most significant one and it 
is followed distantly by the euro and other hard curren-
cies such as the sterling and the yen.21 This market is the 
most important money market at the global level, which 
creates and sustains global liquidity in hard currencies.22 
The Eurocurrency market is a private, non-regulated 
and decentralized structure where global currencies are 
negotiated on a continuum basis. Through it, internatio-
nal economic actors can have access to monetary vehi-
cles to invest, or to settle obligations in foreign curren-
cies at the global level.
This “private” legal structure is imperfectly connec-
ted to the Bretton Woods system of  “official” money, 
i.e. onshore currencies issued by national systems and 
subjected to specific and very limited international obli-
gations related to current account transactions (and not 
to capital account transactions). In fact, during normal 
times, economic actors presuppose that there is a par 
value between onshore (national money) and offshore 
currencies (i.e. the international money represented as 
Eurocurrencies, which serve as means of  payment out-
side the issuer’s country).
However, when crises arise, international money 
tends to “come back home”: to financial institutions 
inside the issuer’s country, which have access to central 
bank money as the last resort. The price of  onshore 
currencies and Eurocurrencies tends to differ in global 
markets. As Merhling23 explains, one symptom of  the 
breakdown of  the international money market in the 
2008 crisis was a large and persistent spread between 
Eurodollar interest rates and the onshore dollar (the 
LIBOR-OIS spread). 
international privé (UEM et euromarchés), 274 Recueil des Cours 
309, 1998.; ___. Souverainété monétaire et utilisation de la monnaie 
par les opérateurs privés. In Kahn (org.), Droit et monnaie: Etats 
et espace monétaire international, CREDIMI, Litec : Dijon, 1988.
21  Here, I am referring to the Eurocurrency market as a frame-
work for Eurocurrencies and Eurobonds, i.e. monetary as well as 
investment vehicles in foreign currencies. 
22  MERHLING, P. Elasticity and discipline in the global swap 
network, working paper for the conference ‘China and the global 
financial system’, Shangai Development Research Foundation, Au-
gust, 2015, pp. 9-14. Available at: < https://www.ineteconomics.
org/uploads/papers/WP27-Mehrling.pdf>. Last accessed 10 April 
2018.
23  MERHLING, P. Elasticity and discipline in the global swap 
network…, 2015, pp. 13-14 (note 23, above).
Since its conception, the rules and the real practi-
ce of  the Bretton Woods system greatly differed.24 The 
idea of  its founders was to assure macroeconomic au-
tonomy to states, a major intellectual change if  one 
compares it to the international gold system before the 
World Wars. In the 1940s, the international monetary 
system was originally conceived as a global order in 
which different currencies were supposed to be used in 
international transactions without hierarchy among them. 
The agreement’s original intention was to use national 
currencies symmetrically in foreign transactions.
Nevertheless, the US dollar became the key currency 
of  the Bretton Woods system. In practical terms, the 
system evolved to a “fixed-rate dollar standard” in the 
1960s.25 In this monetary order, born from practices of  
the post-Bretton Woods agreements, the US dollar and 
its issuer, the Federal Reserve (Fed), became the most 
important engines for the functioning of  the internatio-
nal monetary system. The Eurodollar became the most 
important offshore currency in the world.
In fact, since the failure of  the par value system in 
the 1970s, the US dollar and the Fed became even more 
central to the Bretton Woods system. Since the US 
dollar is no longer linked to gold by an international 
agreement, the Fed’s monetary policy determines the 
value of  this currency in global money markets and deci-
sively influences its demand by other countries. In other 
words, the American central bank influences the value 
of  the Eurodollar, the international money of  the Bret-
ton Woods order, even though the Fed has no direct 
control over this money created outside the US.
At the same time, with the increasing episodes of  
international crises after the 1970s, the IMF started to 
gain more power as global lender of  hard currencies, 
with a growing number of  credit operations. For instan-
ce, the Fund’s total outstanding credit grew from US$ 
20bn in 1981 to US$ 60bn in 1995, reaching US$ 100bn 
in 2001 and more than US$ 140bn in 2012.26 The con-
solidation of  the Fund as an international lender of  last 
24  MCKINNON, R. The Rules of  the Game: International 
Money in Historical Perspective, Journal of  Economic Literature 
31, 1993.
25  MCKINNON, R. The Rules of  the Game…, 1993, at p. 15 
(note 25, above).
26  MOHAN, R., KAPUR, M. Emerging powers and global 
governance: whither the IMF?, IMF working paper 15/219, 2015. 
Available at: < http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/
wp15219.pdf>. Last accessed 10 April 2018.
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resort was heavily reinforced during crises in Asia and 
Latin America, in the 1990s.27 It was also a period in 
which the Fund was highly criticized for its approach to 
political conditionalities.
The Fund’s international reserve asset - i.e. the SDR, 
created in 1969 -, however, was not successful. Since its 
creation, the percentage of  this asset in the global fo-
reign exchange reserves never exceeded 6%.28 The IMF 
Article of  Agreements established that each member 
undertakes the obligation to make the SDR “the princi-
pal reserve asset in the international monetary system” 
(Article VIII, Section 7).
I believe the SDR failed, in the 1970s and the 1980s, 
because it did not evolve into a genuine currency. At 
that time, other international contracts (mainly, curren-
cy derivatives) had an important development at the 
global level and replaced units of  account, such as the 
SDR, as a more efficient instrument to hedge interna-
tional financial operations. Since SDR-denominated 
claims, created by the initiative of  economic actors29, 
did not evolve into significant means of  payment and 
investment vehicles at the global level (such as the Eu-
rocurrencies), the demand for this asset decreased. In 
contrast, the European Currency Unit – ECU (the em-
bryo of  the euro) was a supranational unit of  account, 
created in the same context as the SDR and inspired 
by its design, which became a denominator for priva-
te contractual claims and a legal mechanism to settle 
international obligations between European economic 
actors30. The difference is that the ECU evolved to an 
actual currency traded by private actors. The SDR re-
27  In the 1990s, with M. Camdessus as managing director, the IMF 
was the central organisation in monetary cooperation, formulating 
responses to the Asian and Latin American crises. For a comparison 
of  the Fund’s responses to emerging powers’ crisis in the 1990s and 
in 2008, see DURAN, C. V. The international lender of  last resort 
for emerging countries: a bilateral currency swap?, GEG working 
paper, n. 108, University of  Oxford, 2015a. Available at: < https://
www.geg.ox.ac.uk/sites/geg/files/documents/WP_108%20-%20
The%20International%20Lender%20of%20Last%20Resort%20
for%20Emerging%20Countries%20-%20Camila%20Duran.pdf>. 
Last accessed 10 April 2018.
28  OBSTFELD, M. The SDR as an international reserve as-
set: what future?, International Growth Centre, Rapid Response 
11/0885, 2011.
29  GOLD, Sir J. Development of  the SDR as reserve asset, unit 
of  account and denominator: a survey, 16 Geo. Wash. J. Int’L. & 
Econ. 1, 1981.
30  VISSOL, T. Les monnaies composites: innovation financière, 
innovation monétaire. In Kahn (org.), Droit et monnaie: Etats et 
espace monétaire international, CREDIMI,  Dijon: Litec, 1998.
mained an official asset with limited monetary functions 
and was restricted to the Fund’s members.
However, the SDR represents an unconditional li-
quidity, which can be readily exchanged for hard cur-
rencies, such as the US dollar. It represents a potential 
claim on international money. This is the main econo-
mic function of  the SDR in the current system and 
what induced its demand from emerging and develo-
ping countries after the 2008 crisis.
At the global level, the American currency is still 
the main reserve for central banks, representing more 
than 60% of  international reserves.31 Consequently, 
emerging and developing countries rely on the supply 
of  a hard currency by the Fed (in the US) and the Eu-
rodollar market (outside the US). In times of  crisis, they 
can have access to it through a multilateral institution, 
the IMF. Since the Fund is not a central bank, this mo-
netary system is based on “limited discounting”32, i.e. 
the economic capacity of  the multilateral organization 
is linked to the contribution of  member countries in 
hard currencies.
I argue that there is an inherent inconsistency in the 
Bretton Woods framework. The IMF is the main orga-
nization for global monetary cooperation. Yet it cannot 
issue the major currency for global transactions. The 
Fund is merely an intermediary between the issuers of  
hard currencies, or surplus countries, and deficit coun-
tries. The price of  this intermediation is political con-
ditionalities (in ex ante or ex post forms). The Fed has 
national mandates, but it issues and manages the key 
currency for the Bretton Woods system.
In the 2000s, benefiting from high prices in interna-
tional commodity markets, emerging countries in Latin 
America and Asia could accumulate foreign exchange 
reserves to counter capital flows (Figure 1). This type 
of  unilateral action had precautionary purposes.33 The 
motivation behind the accumulation of  reserves was at-
tributed to political stigma towards the Fund, created by 
political conditionalities imposed in lending programs 
during the 1990s34. 
31  The US dollar even achieved more than 70% of  global re-
serves in the end of  the 1990s. Source: IMF statistics; COFER. 
32  KINDLEBERGER, C., ALIBER, Z. R. Manias, panics, and 
crashes: a history of  financial crises. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011 [1978].
33  It had also intervention objectives to influence the value of  the 
emerging countries’ currencies and incentivize exports.
34  IMF – International Monetary Fund. Review on flexible 
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Figure 1. G20 emerging countries in Asia and Latin 
America: foreign exchange reserve accumulation (1990-
2015)
Source: World Bank. Elaborated Developed by the au-
thor.
Notwithstanding the economic costs of  reserve ac-
cumulation, this type of  unilateral action secured politi-
cal leverage for emerging countries once the 2008 crisis 
hit.35 They could choose their lender of  last resort. A 
small number of  emerging powers had direct access to 
currency swaps directly with the Fed (i.e. Brazil, Mexico, 
South Korea and Singapore), instead of  going to the 
IMF. In addition, emerging countries, using the power 
granted by their reserves, formalized bilateral commit-
ments with the Fund as lenders, and not as borrowers.
Furthermore, in the 2008 aftermath, these countries 
were able to formulate new agreements for monetary 
cooperation to respond to future liquidity crises by poo-
ling their reserves in US dollars. The accumulation of  
reserves created economic and political conditions for 
emerging powers to design exit and voice strategies for 
monetary cooperation. They were able to challenge the 
status quo of  the Bretton Woods system, since they could 
accumulate the key currency for the functioning of  the 
global monetary order.
credit line, the precautionary and liquidity line, and the rapid financ-
ing instrument, IMF Policy Paper, Washington DC, 2014. Avail-
able at: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/
Issues/2016/12/31/Review-of-the-Flexible-Credit-Line-the-Pre-
cautionary-and-Liquidity-Line-and-the-Rapid-PP4846>. Last ac-
cessed 10 April 2018.; IEO – Independent Evaluation Office of  
the International Monetary Fund. IMF response to the financial 
and economic crisis: evaluation report. Washington DC: IMF, 2014. 
Available at: <http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/pages/EvaluationIm-
ages227.aspx>. Last accessed 10 April 2018.
35  DURAN, C. V. The international lender of  last resort for 
emerging countries…, 2015a (note 28, above).
In fact, in 2008, the Fed confirmed the US dollar 
hegemony and played the role of  lender of  last resort 
for selected market and countries.36 Thus, the manage-
ment of  the crisis reaffirmed the US dollar’s centrality: 
quantitative easing policy (as well as the latter “taper 
tantrum”) sent shockwaves through countries worldwi-
de, the so-called ‘spillover’ effects. The former Brazilian 
Minister of  Finance, Guido Mantega, coined the term 
“currency war” in 2010 and blamed the US for the “tsu-
nami” of  liquidity that flooded emerging countries.37 
Nevertheless, the Fed’s actions supported the supply of  
international money at the global monetary order along 
with multilateral organizations, such as the IMF.
3. bretton woods system in the 2008 
aftermath: whiCh monetary strategies?
The IMF power structure is predominantly gover-
ned by traditional powers reflecting the context of  the 
Bretton Woods agreements in the 1940s and the conso-
lidation of  the US leadership in the post-world wars.38 
36  See: AIZENMAN, P. Selective swap arrangements and the 
global financial crisis: analysis and interpretation, International Re-
view of  Economics and Finance 19 (3), 2010.; ALLEN, W., MOE-
SSNER, R. Central bank co-operation and international liquidity in 
the financial crisis of  2008-9”, LSE Financial Markets Group Paper 
series 187, 2010.; MOESSNER, R., Allen, W. Banking crises and the 
international monetary system in the Great Depression and now, 
BIS working paper 333, 2010. Available at: < https://www.bis.org/
publ/work333.htm>. Last accessed 10 April 2018.; MCDOWELL, 
D. The US as ‘sovereign international last-resort lender’: the Fed’s 
currency swap programme during the great panic of  2007-2009, 
New Political Economy, v. 17, n. 2, 2012; The emergent interna-
tional liquidity network: central bank cooperation after the global 
financial crisis”, working paper presented at the 2015 ISA annual 
conference.; BROZ, J. L. The Politics of  Rescuing the World’s Fi-
nancial System: The Federal Reserve as a Global Lender of  Last 
Resort, San Diego: University of  California, 2014.; DESTAIS, C. 
Central Bank Currency Swaps and the International Monetary Sys-
tem, Policy brief  CEPII, Sep, 2014. Available at: <http://www.cepii.
fr/CEPII/en/publications/pb/abstract.asp?NoDoc=7203>. Last 
accessed 10 April 2018.
37  See the news at the Financial Times “Brazil in ‘curren-
cy war’ alert”, September 27, 2010 (available at: http://www.
ft.com/cms/s/0/33ff9624-ca48-11df-a860-00144feab49a.
html#axzz41CrZoFUD)
38  The US decisively consolidated this role contributing to the 
management of  the Bretton Woods’ par value system in the 1960s. 
Kindleberger developed what became known as the “theory of  he-
gemonic stability”. According to him, the world needs at least one 
leader (a “bénévole” hegemon) to sustain the global monetary order. 
See: KINDLEBERGER, C. The World in Depression, Berkeley: 
University of  California Press, 1973.
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Even if  their share in global GDP (in PPP basis) for the 
Group of  7 (G7) is approximately 32%, the G7 coun-
tries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and the United States) accumulate more than 
41% of  the Fund’s voting shares. The corresponding 
share for emerging and developing countries at the 
Fund is 44%, despite their GDP representing almost 
57% of  global wealth.39
Currently, the Fund is an organization of  189 na-
tions. Despite the growing membership adherence af-
ter the 1960s and the 1990s, with the decolonization of  
countries in Africa and Asia and the breakdown of  the 
Soviet Union,40 the distribution of  the Fund’s quotas 
changed little over time. Quotas are an important fea-
ture of  the IMF. They determine its total economic ca-
pacity and represent a permanent commitment of  each 
member to lend to the organization. They are also a 
crucial element of  the IMF’s structure, because quotas 
define the limits to borrow, the voting power and the 
allocation of  SDRs for each member.41
The Fund conducts general quota reviews in five-
-year intervals (Article III, Section 2 (a), Articles of  
Agreement). There have been 14 general reviews to 
date. The far-reaching reforms in the Fund’s history 
were proposed in 2010, as part of  a package to ma-
nage the 2008 crisis.42 This group of  reforms doubled 
its economic capacity (from US$ 329bn to US$ 659bn) 
and shifted 6% of  the quotas’ share towards emerging 
and developing countries (representing 5.7% of  voting 
power). This quota reform was called by the G20 in 
2009 and 2010, notably during the London and Seoul 
Summits. However, despite persistent calls by the 
group,43 the US Congress only confirmed the Fund’s 
39  Source: IMF statistics.
40  The IMF membership grew from 69 countries in 1960 to 138 
in 1978.
41  The actual quota formula is defined as a weighted average of  
the country’s GDP (50%), its degree of  economic openness (30%), 
the economic variability (15%) and its international reserves (5%). 
Source: IMF website.
42  This package was influenced by the 2008 Quota and Voice 
Reforms implemented in 2011. As a result of  this ad hoc review, the 
Fund had an increase of  US$ 27bn in its economic capacity and the 
quotas were distributed among 54 countries. It also tripled the basic 
votes of  low-income countries.
43  The last call was expressed at the Antalya Summit, in Turkey. 
The Communiqué registered: “We remain deeply disappointed with 
the continued delay in implementing the IMF quota and govern-
ance reforms agreed in 2010. The 2010 reforms remain our highest 
priority for the IMF and we urge the United States to ratify these 
reforms as soon as possible. Mindful of  the aims of  the 2010 re-
quota change at the end of  2015. Thus, the 14th general 
quota review became effective on January 26, 2016.44
In addition to calls for greater participation and re-
presentation in the Fund, emerging powers looked for 
other forms of  monetary cooperation. First, they for-
malized note purchases and the New Arrangements to 
Borrow (NAB) with the Fund, investing as lenders of  
the IMF. These actions reveal that they are looking for 
other ways of  participating in the Bretton Woods sys-
tem. Secondly, they reinforced or created parallel mone-
tary structures, such as the Asian Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization (CMIM)45 and the BRICS’46 Contin-
gent Reserve Arrangement (CRA).
3.1. Voice monetary strategies
There were four main voice strategies implemented 
by these countries: (1) calls through the G20 meetings 
for the quota’s increase and voting power shift in the 
IMF structure; (2) calls for new allocation of  SDRs; (3) 
formalization of  temporary financial agreements with 
the Fund as lenders (note purchases and NAB); and 
(4) specifically in relation to China, calls for a more im-
portant role for the Fund’s SDR as a global currency 
and calls for the inclusion of  the Renminbi in the SDR 
basket.47 This last strategy aimed at challenging the US 
dollar’s hegemony in the Bretton Woods system.
forms, we ask the IMF to complete its work on an interim solution 
that will meaningfully converge quota shares as soon as and to the 
extent possible to the levels agreed under the 14th General Review 
of  Quotas” (item 17, G20 Leaders’ Communiqué Antalya Summit, 
15-16 November 2015).
44  Source: IMF. See the official description of  the quota’s reform 
at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm 
45  This regional monetary arrangement is formed by the ten 
members of  the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and Japan, China and South Korea (“plus 3” countries).
46  BRICS is an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa.
47  The G20 communiqué of  the Antalya Summit endorsed the 
Chinese interests in relation to the SDR: “We reaffirm that the Spe-
cial Drawing Rights (SDR) basket composition should continue to 
reflect the role of  currencies in the global trading and financial sys-
tem and look forward to the completion of  the review of  the meth-
od of  valuation of  the SDR” (item 17, G20 Leaders’ Communiqué 
Antalya Summit, 15-16 November 2015).
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Table 2. G20 emerging powers in Asia and Latin Amer-
ica: voice monetary strategies in the 2008 aftermath
Voice strategies G20 emerging powers
Calls for quota review (IMF’s 
2010 general quota review)
China, South Korea, Indonesia, 
India, Brazil, Mexico and Ar-
gentina
Call for new allocations of  
SDRs
China, South Korea, Indonesia, 
India, Brazil, Mexico and Ar-
gentina
NAB and/or note purchase 
with the Fund
China, South Korea, India, Bra-
zil and Mexico
Renminbi as a currency of  the 
Fund’s SDR basket and calls for 
a more important role for the 
SDR as a global currency
China
Source: IMF and G20 meetings’ minutes. Developed 
by the author.
In the immediate aftermath of  the 2008 crisis, the 
biggest emerging powers in Latin America and Asia (for 
instance, China, South Korea, India, Brazil and Mexico) 
expected to be recognized in a different way at the in-
ternational level: not as deficit countries, but instead as 
surplus countries. The engagement of  some emerging 
economies as lenders rather than borrowers of  the IMF 
(Table 2) suggests that the Fund may in fact be the site 
of  future cooperation on global monetary governance, 
even as a political stalemate over reforms continues to 
undercut its legitimacy and mires the institution in iner-
tia.
As a whole, I argue that the emerging powers’ voice 
strategies had a partial and delayed victory. In January 
2016, the IMF had finally confirmed a quota increase, 
which expanded its economic capacity in dealing with 
liquidity crises. It also contributes to additional certainty 
in monetary support, since the quotas are more perma-
nent financial commitments if  compared to note pur-
chases or other temporary arrangements, such as the 
NAB.
Nevertheless, the increase of  quotas combined with 
its correspondent voting power modification only im-
pacted incrementally the Fund’s governance. Merely 
5.7% of  voting power was shifted towards emerging 
countries, notably to the benefit of  China, Brazil, India, 
Mexico and South Korea. Argentina had a slight cut in 
its voting share due to the devaluation of  its currency 
for the calculation of  GDP size, reflecting its economic 
conditions after the 2001 crisis.48 Indonesia had a very 
small addition to its voting power. For the countries in 
this sample, the individual increase in voting shares is 
identified below (Table 3). Only for China was this voi-
ce strategy  a relatively more important victory. China 
saw its voting share almost double (from 3.6% to 6%) 
and it is today the third-largest member country, after 
the US and Japan.
Table 3. IMF voting shares before and after the 2010 
general quota review (effective on January 26, 2016)
G20 emerging 
powers
(Asia and Latin 
America) 
As of  March 2, 
2011 
(in %)1
Post-2010 Reform
As of  January 26, 
2016 
(in %)
China 3.651 6.068
South Korea 1.328 1.730
Indonesia 0.947 0.950
India 1.882 2.627
Brazil 1.377 2.217
Mexico 1.430 1.795
Argentina 0.964 0.661
Source: IMF (Link: https://www.imf.org/external/
np/sec/pr/2011/pdfs/quota_tbl.pdf)
The shares reallocated to emerging countries came 
mostly at the expense of  European members - in par-
ticular, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Netherlan-
ds and Belgium. The US still maintains relevant veto 
power at the Fund (16.5% of  the voting share), since 
key decisions require a majority of  85% – i.e. the ad-
justment in quotas, any amendment to the Articles of  
Agreement and the allocation of  SDRs.
The relative failure of  voice strategies could also be 
attributed to the forum used to articulate them. My main 
argument is that the G20, as an informal governmental 
network, could not promote substantial structural chan-
ges to the global monetary system. International private 
money (i.e. “Eurocurrencies”) is global private liquidi-
ty49, which is used by foreign exchange markets and in-
48  Argentina, however, sustained at the G20 the IMF reform and 
called for a more important role for emerging economies. That was 
the declaration of  Miguel Pesce, vice governor of  the Argentinean 
central bank in 2009 (“Nuestro país buscará impulsar cambios en 
el sistema de prestámos del Fondo y conseguir un mayor poder de 
voto para las economías emergentes”, see at: http://www.infobae.
com/2009/02/11/431190-para-argentina-reformar-el-fmi-es-
prioridad-cumbre-del-g20).
49  For the economic perspective on global liquidity, see also 
LANDAU, J. P. Global liquidity: public and private. In Global di-
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ternational banking institutions. From 2007, this market 
relied on central banks, issuers of  hard currencies (and 
not on the IMF), to sustain the par value between onsho-
re and offshore money. For instance, the Fed assured 
the par value between the onshore US dollar and the Eu-
rodollar by providing financial support to US branches 
of  foreign institutions, and currency swaps with foreign 
central banks, including emerging countries. 
Starting from December 2007, the Fed established a 
temporary network of  swaps based on bilateral agree-
ments with central banks in advanced economies (the 
Bank of  England, the European Central Bank - ECB, 
the Bank of  Japan, the Swiss National Bank, the Re-
serve Bank of  Australia, the Bank of  Canada, Danma-
rks Nationalbank, the Reserve Bank of  New Zealand, 
Norges Bank and Sveriges Riksbank), and later with 
emerging countries (Brazil, South Korea, Singapore and 
Mexico). In 2013, the Fed set up a permanent and un-
limited network of  swaps with the ECB, the Bank of  
Japan, the Bank of  England, the Swiss National Bank 
and the Bank of  Canada, the so-called “C6”.50 These 
swaps tend to sustain the regular functioning of  the 
Eurodollar money market, offering direct access to in-
ternational money by the Fed through central banks in 
advanced economies. In this sense, the US unilateral ac-
tions supported the Bretton Woods system by saving 
international private money in US dollars.
At the peak of  the crisis, the Fed’s currency swaps 
attained a value of  US$ 580bn in December 2008 re-
presenting more than 45% of  its total assets.51 At that 
time, as a comparison, the Fund had only SDR 238bn 
in quotas (approximately US$ 355bn at the December 
1, 2008 exchange rate). Its funding was boosted by the 
G20 meetings after 2009 through temporary additional 
pledges and committed resources, not as readily availa-
ble funding. Also in 2009, the IMF attempted to create 
two lending instruments based on ex ante conditions and 
with precautionary effects, i.e. the Flexible Credit Line 
(FCL) and the Precautionary Credit Line (PCL). Howe-
ver, the demand for these instruments was low and it 
remains low.52 Only Mexico, Colombia and Poland had 
mensions of  unconventional monetary policy, Federal Reserve Bank 
of  Kansas City Jackson Hole symposium, 2013.
50  MERHLING, P. Elasticity and discipline in the global swap 
network…, 2015, p. 15 (note 24, above).
51  LANDAU, J. P. Global liquidity..., 2013, p. 49 (note 51, above).
52  IMF – International Monetary Fund. Review on flexible credit 
line…, 2014 (note 34, above). 
access to the FCL and Morocco to the PCL. Mexico 
and Colombia are still attached to this instrument and 
they are suffering from “exit stigma”.53
Therefore, focusing on the IMF instead of  central 
bank networks was perhaps a less effective political ac-
tion implemented by emerging countries. As argued by 
Helleiner54, during the 2008 crisis management, the cur-
rency swaps between the Fed and other central banks 
were greater in value and in importance for stabilizing 
international turbulence compared to the Fund’s len-
ding agreements. The Fund’s new lending instruments 
and SDR allocations came too late (only in 2009), when 
the Fed had already implemented the major actions 
months before.
From an economic perspective, as suggested by 
Mehrling55, more important than official borrowing or 
reserve flows to manage liquidity crises is the network 
of  central bank swaps that serve as backstop to mo-
ney markets. In his view, the role of  central banks as 
bankers’ banks (and not government banks) is central 
to understand what stabilized money markets in the 
post-2008 crisis. The modern international private mo-
ney (offshore Eurodollar market) is sustained by central 
bank actions, not by governments and their borrowing 
relations with international organizations, such as the 
IMF. 
In this sense, voice strategies aimed at influencing 
the global monetary landscape could be more usefully 
implemented at the central bankers’ fortress for coope-
ration, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), ra-
ther than at the Fund. The BIS is a site for central bank 
cooperation for financial regulation and supervision, 
and could be more utilized for monetary governance 
as well, since bilateral agreements based on currency 
swaps became a key instrument to manage global crises.
In addition, at the time of  the 2008 crisis, the Fund 
was suffering from political stigma related to its lending 
programs implemented during the 1990s. The major 
institutional flaw of  the Bretton Woods system – i.e. an 
international organization (the IMF) in charge of  mo-
netary cooperation and a national central bank (the Fed) 
53  IMF – International Monetary Fund. Review on flexible credit 
line…, 2014 (note 34, above).
54  HELLEINER, Eric. The Status Quo Crisis: Global Financial 
Governance after the 2008 Crisis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014.
55  MERHLING, P. Elasticity and discipline in the global swap 
network…, 2015 (note 24, above).
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responsible for the issuance and the management of  the 
key currency – surfaced aggressively. Thus, taking into 
account the economic and political context of  2008, the 
IMF could contribute less to the stability of  the global 
(private) monetary system compared to the network of  
developed economies’ central banks, issuers of  hard 
currencies.
Meanwhile, the choice of  emerging countries in be-
coming lenders of  the IMF was perhaps a less valuable 
strategy. It may have contributed to the delay of  the US 
Congress’ confirmation of  the 2010 reform. It clearly 
vocalized the economic power of  emerging countries 
and it had a symbolic effect. Yet it ruled out the pressing 
needs of  the Fund’s financing by providing temporary 
resources. The lack of  sufficient resources could have 
been used as a source of  economic pressure. It proved 
to be useful to force the US Congress to confirm the 
Fund’s quota increases in other critical historical mo-
ments, particularly in 1978 and 1983, during the 7th and 
8th general quota review. This was a tactic employed 
twice by De Larosière, managing director of  the Fund 
between 1978 and 1987.56 A late US legislative confir-
mation of  the 14th quota review (only after five years) 
could also be explained by the fact that the Fund’s re-
sources were, in a certain way, assured if  larger coun-
tries were to apply for it.
Finally, the revival of  the old idea involving a global 
monetary standard,57 i.e. the reinforcement of  the IMF’s 
SDR, was expressed by the president of  the People’s 
Bank of  China (PBoC) in 2009, Zhou Xiaochuan. The 
statement  “Reform the international monetary system” 
was a contribution to rethink the global order that re-
sulted as a practice of  the Bretton Woods agreements 
based on one key currency.58 None of  the SDR refor-
56  MOHAN, R., KAPUR, M. Emerging powers and global gov-
ernance…, 2015, p. 24; BOUGHTON, J. M. Silent Revolution…, 
p. 859.
57  Originally, Keynes proposed the “bancor” as a global cur-
rency to be issued (and not merely allocated) by the Bretton Woods’ 
monetary institution (named by him as the “International Clearing 
Union”). For the historical and innovative Keynes Plan, KEYNES, 
J. M. Proposals for an International Clearing Union (Keynes Plan). 
In: HORSEFIELD, J. K. (ed.), The International Monetary Fund 
1945-1965, vol. III: Documents, IMF, Washington, (1969 [1943]).. 
Nussbaum identifies the first idea of  world money in the Italian 
work of  Gasparo Scaruffi, in 1582 (Alitinonfo). His plan was based 
in an idea of  the moneta imaginaria, which would serve as a global 
unit of  account. See: NUSSBAUM, A. A note on the idea of  world 
money, Political Science Quartely, v. 64, n. 3, 1949.
58  XIAOCHUAN, Z. Reform the international monetary system, 
BIS, 23 March, 2009. Available at: <https://www.bis.org/review/
ms vocalized by M. Xiaochuan was adopted, except the 
proposal of  new general allocation called for during the 
G20 Summit in London.
Accomplished by the Fund in August 2009, the SDR 
allocation, despite its unprecedented size (US$ 250bn), 
had a minor economic impact for emerging powers. 
Since the allocation of  SDRs is defined by quotas, 
the impact tends to be less significant for the largest 
emerging countries. The SDR is more valuable, as an 
unconditional source of  financial support, for smaller 
developing countries. For instance, Brazil, South Korea 
and Mexico are examples of  how low the impact of  the 
SDR was: all had formalized currency swaps with the 
Fed during the crisis (US$ 30bn each) that outstripped 
ten times their SDR holdings (at about US$ 3bn each). 
Meanwhile, Ecuador, a smaller developing country, co-
ped with the crisis by using loans from the Latin Ame-
rican Reserve Fund (FLAR) on three occasions: in 2009 
(US$ 480 million), 2010 (US$ 515 million) and in 2014 
(US$ 618 million). These values are close to Ecuador’s 
SDR holdings, a total of  US$ 411 million.
Despite the incomplete victory of  voice strategies 
among emerging powers, the major Chinese success 
came in 2015 with the inclusion of  the Renminbi in the 
SDR value along with the US dollar, the euro, the ster-
ling and the yen.59 Even if, up to the present, the SDR 
basket is only the “backdoor” of  the Bretton Woods 
system, I believe that this decision potentially has  the 
capacity to transform the global monetary architecture.
The Renminbi carries a different concept of  inter-
national money, which is based on the idea of  “mana-
ged convertibility”.60 China declared that it intends to 
maintain capital account management, which means: 
(1) macroprudential management of  the private sector’s 
external debt; (2) management of  short-term speculati-
ve capital flows; (3) adoption of  temporary capital con-
r090402c.pdf>. Last accessed 10 April 2018.
59  The Fund’s decision will take effect in October 2016.
60  XIAOCHUAN, Z. IMFC Statement by the Honorable Zhou 
Xiaochuan Governor of  the IMF for China to the Thirty-First 
Meeting April 18, 2015. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/Exter-
nal/spring/2015/imfc/statement/eng/chn.pdf>. Last accessed 10 
April 2018 LUBIN, D. China and the SDR: a big change in 2015?, 
Emerging Markets Macro View, Citi Research Economics, March, 
2015.; DURAN, C. V. Avoiding the next liquidity crunch: how the 
G20 must support monetary cooperation to increase resilience to 
crisis, GEG / BSG policy brief, University of  Oxford, October, 
2015b. Available at: <http://www.geg.ox.ac.uk/avoiding-next-
liquidity-crunch-how-g20-must-support-monetary-cooperation-
increase-resilience-crisis>. Last accessed 10 April 2018.
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trols in case of  “abnormal” fluctuations in international 
markets, or balance of  payments problems; and (4) mo-
nitoring of  cross-border financial transactions, which 
involve money laundering and financing of  terrorism, 
as well as the exploitation of  tax havens.61 
Thus, China may promote significant modifications 
to the practices of  the Fund’s concept of  “freely usable 
currency”, which represented, up to present, free and 
ready convertibility of  hard currencies. The inclusion 
in the SDR basket was also especially relevant for ano-
ther Chinese plan: a type of  exit strategy, which tends to 
challenge the US dollar hegemony over time.
3.2. Exit monetary strategies
From the perspective of  monetary governance, exit 
plans seem to confirm the idea of  “contested multila-
teralism” proposed by Morse and Keohane.62 Monetary 
strategies designed as exit options created competing 
institutional arrangements through bilateral and regio-
nal agreements based on currency swaps.
The main exit strategies formulated by G20 emer-
ging powers were: (1) the reinforcement or the creation 
of  parallel monetary arrangements based on the “poo-
ling” of  reserves in US dollars; and (2) specifically in 
relation to China and to a lesser extent South Korea, In-
dia and Indonesia, the creation of  alternatives to the US 
dollar through the formalization of  bilateral agreements 
between central banks in national currencies with trade 
purposes and/or short-term liquidity financing. China 
is the main emerging economy driving changes in the 
international monetary system by formulating exit stra-
tegies.
61  XIAOCHUAN, Z. IMFC Statement by the Honorable Zhou 
Xiaochuan…, 2015, p. 5.
62  MORSE, J. C., KEOHANE, R. O. Contested Multilateral-
ism…, 2014 (note 10, above).
Table 4. G20 emerging powers in Asia and Latin Ame-
rica: exit monetary strategies in the 2008 aftermath
Emerging 
powers Exit strategies
China
Reinforcement of  the CMIM
Total of  US$ 240bn
Creation of  the BRICS’ CRA
Total of  US$ 100bn
Bilateral currency swaps in Renminbi (32 
agreements - Hong Kong SAR, South Korea, 
Singapore, Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, 
New Zealand, Mongolia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, European Central 
Bank, United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, Russia, 
Switzerland, Argentina, United Arab Emirates, 
Qatar, South Africa, Chile, Ukraine, Turkey, 
Hungary, Belarus, Iceland, Albania, Suriname and 
Armenia)
Total: equivalent of  US$ 465.67bn
South 
Korea
Reinforcement of  the CMIM
Total of  US$ 240bn
Bilateral currency swaps in Korean Won (4 
agreements - China, Australia, Indonesia and 
Malaysia)
Total: equivalent to US$ 74.5bn
Indonesia
Reinforcement of  the CMIM
Total of  US$ 240bn
Bilateral currency swaps in Rupia (3 agreements - 
China, Korea and Japan)
Total: equivalent to US$ 13.8bn
India
Creation of  the BRICS’ CRA
Total of  US$ 100bn
Bilateral currency swaps in Rupee (Japan and 
SAARC nations – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka).
Total: equivalent to US$ 52bn
Brazil
Creation of  the BRICS’ CRA
Total of  US$ 100bn
Bilateral currency swaps in Real (1 agreement - 
China)
Total: equivalent of  US$ 18.3bn
Creation of  the SML - System of  Payments in 
Local Currencies (Argentina and Uruguay)
Total: equivalent to US$ 160 million
Mexico No exit strategy announced
Argentina
Bilateral currency swaps in Peso (1 agreement - 
China)
Total: equivalent of  US$ 2.5bn
Creation of  the System of  Payments in Local 
Currencies - SML (Brazil and Uruguay)
Total: equivalent to  US$ 160 million
Source: IMF 2015; World Bank and central banks’ 
websites; The Hindu, The Financial Times; Brazilian Law 
n. 11.803/2008. Developed by the author.
The first exit strategy was materialized in two arran-
gements: the expansion and multilateralization of  the 
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Asian Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and the establish-
ment of  the BRICS’ CRA. Asian countries added to the 
former CMI agreement, created originally in 2000: (i) a 
multilateral framework for currency swaps based on a 
single contractual agreement and a regional macroeco-
nomic office in Singapore for surveillance, (ii) a precau-
tionary credit instrument (inspired by the Fund’s FCL 
and PCL), (iii) an increase of  the members’ financial 
commitments (from US$ 80bn in 2000 to US$ 240bn 
in 2014); and (iv) a decrease of  de jure link with the IMF 
lending programs (from 80% to 70%).63 The CRA was 
created by the BRICS countries in 2014 and it was ins-
pired by the CMIM. The total amount of  the agreement 
reaches US$ 100bn.64
Both agreements have an inherent flaw (a shared 
trait with the IMF): they are dependent on the supply 
of  US dollars by the Fed and the continuity of  reser-
ve accumulation as a model of  unilateral action. This 
strategy, based on regional arrangements, reveals the 
emerging countries’ dependence on the supply of  inter-
national money. Therefore, their capacity in promoting 
significant changes in global monetary governance may 
be less effective than one would expect.
In fact, these new regional arrangements have a 
specific legal structure: they are international treaties, 
which formalize currency swaps between national au-
thorities (i.e. central banks). They are not organized 
as international institutions, such as the IMF. Regional 
agreements based on swaps entail pre-commitment of  
resources, which are not “transferred” to an institution 
with a specific mandate. Instead, all these reserves in 
US dollars are held in national hands until the activa-
tion of  a swap contract. It means that, in an event of  
63  For the history of  the CMI, see SUSSANGKARN, C. Chiang 
Mai Initiative Multilateralization: origin, development, and outlook, 
Asian Economic Policy Review 6, 2011.and GRIMES, W. W. The 
Asian Monetary Fund reborn? Implications of  Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization, Asia Policy 11, 2011.
64  For more details on the BRICS CRA, see its treaty published 
at Brazilian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs’ website: http://brics6.ita-
maraty.gov.br/media2/press-releases/220-treaty-for-the-establish-
ment-of-a-brics-contingent-reserve-arrangement-fortaleza-july-15 
In the 2012 BRICS Summit, countries were also discussing also a 
master agreement for credit in local currencies. See the statement: 
“[w]e welcome the conclusion of  the Master Agreement on Extend-
ing Credit Facility in Local Currency under BRICS Interbank Coop-
eration Mechanism and the Multilateral Letter of  Credit Confirma-
tion Facility Agreement between our EXIM/Development Banks. 
We believe that these Agreements will serve as useful enabling in-
struments for enhancing intra-BRICS trade in coming years” (item 
18, BRICS’ Delhi Declaration, March 2012).
a crisis, there is no guarantee that a central bank will 
actually provide the resources. For instance, the BRICS’ 
members can opt out of  providing support in the CRA 
framework and can request early repayment if  a pro-
blem occurs in the balance of  payment. This is also the 
case for the CMIM, even if  it has already established a 
macroeconomic office in Singapore, which could be an 
embryo of  a monetary organization in the future.
A specific political factor was relevant to the ex-
pansion of  monetary structures based on swaps: the 
growing power of  national central banks at the inter-
national level in developed and emerging countries65. 
The Great Moderation (1984-2008) and the process of  
de jure and de facto political autonomy achieved after the 
1990s empowered central banks inside their countries’ 
bureaucracies. These institutions could influence the 
political choices in designing monetary arrangements in 
the 2008 aftermath. International institutional arrange-
ments based on currency swaps (instead of  internatio-
nal organizations) allow central banks to maintain con-
trol over foreign exchange reserves they manage, or the 
currency they issue.
Notably Asian emerging countries, i.e. China, South 
Korea, India and Indonesia, are heavily using an exit 
strategy model, which could be relatively more success-
ful in changing the international monetary architecture: 
they are formalizing currency swaps in national curren-
cies. China has 32 agreements with different countries 
as well as offshore structures to assure payment settle-
ment and investments in Renminbi.66 The total amount 
of  the swap network reaches RMB 3.159 tri (equivalent 
of  US$ 465,67 bn). 
This type of  monetary structure is based on specific 
knowledge: how international money is used at the glo-
bal level (through Eurocurrencies) and how State ins-
titutions (mainly, central banks) interact with financial 
markets to assure the international value of  a currency 
(as a backstop in times of  crisis). 
65  DURAN, C. V. The international lender of  last resort for 
emerging countries…, 2015a (note 28, above).
66  IMF – International Monetary Fund. Review on flexible 
credit line, the precautionary and liquidity line, and the rapid financ-
ing instrument, IMF Policy Paper, Washington DC, 2014. Avail-
able at: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/
Issues/2016/12/31/Review-of-the-Flexible-Credit-Line-the-Pre-
cautionary-and-Liquidity-Line-and-the-Rapid-PP4846>. Last ac-
cessed 10 April 2018.; BERNES, T. A., Jenkins, P., Mehrling, P., 
Neilson, D. China’s engagement…, 2015 (note 16, above).
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Thus, China clearly has two levels of  exit strategies: 
regional arrangements as an alternative to the Bretton 
Woods institutions (such as the IMF), and the promo-
tion of  the Renminbi as an international currency to 
exit from the US dollar-centered order. Both strategies 
are linked to each other, since member countries of  
these new regional arrangements are still dependent on 
the US dollar. However, the choice of  using another 
currency depends on the capacity of  the PBoC to as-
sure access to the Renminbi even in times of  crisis (i.e. 
through bilateral swaps), which is the main challenge 
of  this type of  “contested multilateralism” in monetary 
governance.
The functioning of  international money could also 
explain why emerging countries have been investing in 
voice and exit strategies at the same time. It is not just 
about using exit to amplify voice.67 It involves concerns 
about political legitimacy of  the IMF as well as economic 
efficiency of  monetary agreements. The most efficient 
way of  shifting power from the US towards other actors 
and structures is investing in the emergence of  new glo-
bal currencies. To do so, the contribution of  the Fund 
tends to be small: in the short-term, mainly though the 
“symbolism” of  the SDR basket and, in the long-term, 
only promoting a fundamental modification on the con-
cept and operations of  international money.
The network of  currency swaps between emerging 
powers’ central banks seem to be a more important ar-
rangement to promote this exit plan and to implement 
the strategy of  contested multilateralism. In this regard, 
countries in Asia are more engaged in this type of  mo-
netary scheme. Emerging powers in Latin America are 
merely recipients of  these contracts. Argentina, for ins-
tance, is using swaps with China to exchange Renminbi 
for US dollars in foreign exchange markets.68 It is an 
indirect way of  obtaining international money, until the 
Renminbi consolidates itself  as a global currency. Me-
xico seems to be the most loyal emerging power to the 
Bretton Woods institutions: it has announced no exit 
strategy. The only NAFTA69 member, who has swaps in 
67  HIRSCHMAN, A. O. Exit, voice, and loyalty…, 1970 (note 
8, above).
68  See the news entitled: “El Banco Central logró convertir a 
dólares 3086 millones del swap con China”, La Nation December 
22, 2015 available at: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1856429-el-ban-
co-central-logro-convertir-a-dolares-3086-millones-del-swap-con-
china 
69  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) com-
prises Unites States, Mexico and Canada.
Renminbi with China, is Canada.
Brazil and Argentina are re-investing in a traditional 
Latin American way of  monetary cooperation: the esta-
blishment of  clearinghouses and official credit lines be-
tween central banks mainly for trade purposes (and not 
for short-term financing). The SML is a clearinghouse 
to settle commercial transactions using the Brazilian real 
and Argentinean peso (as well as the Uruguayan peso).70 
The total amount, however, is very low if  compared to 
the emerging power’s central bank network in Asia.
Despite the inertia of  international monetary sche-
mes, the most effective plan, as alternative to the Bret-
ton Woods system, seems to promote more cross-bor-
der transactions in new currencies. The institutional 
framework to sustain these transactions is under cons-
truction: a network of  central bank swaps in national 
currencies. The institutional intent is to build a public 
backstop for short-term financing in times of  crisis, 
when economic actors challenge the par value between 
onshore and Eurocurrencies.
However, it is important to emphasize that these 
structures come with a cost. Regional treaties based on 
swaps, or on the less formal network of  central bank 
arrangements in national currencies, tend to contribute 
to the fragmentation of  global monetary governance. 
Contested multilateralism in monetary affairs can pro-
mote more uncertainty in times of  crisis. Even though 
exit plans created more sources of  liquidity, they are 
based on flexible contracts among national authorities.
3.3. Practical consequences of G20 emerging 
powers’ voice and exit strategies
The combination of  relatively failed voice strategies 
with potentially successful exit arrangements has a prac-
tical and critical consequence: the institutional fragmen-
tation of  the global monetary system. Emerging powers 
with growing foreign exchange reserves, managed by in-
dependent central banks, are changing the landscape of  
monetary cooperation.71 The system tends to be more 
70  The SML is a continuum of  the Agreement on Reciprocal Pay-
ments and Credits (CCR), created in 1982 by the ALADI (Latin 
American Integration Association) and formalized by the central 
banks of  central banks of  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Co-
lombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, the Dominican Republic, 
Uruguay and Venezuela.
71  DURAN, C. V. The international lender of  last resort for 
emerging countries…, 2015a (note 28, above).
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complex and fragmented with the decentralization of  
multilateral cooperation.
New forms of  regional and bilateral monetary ar-
rangements have been reinforced or created in the post-
-crisis world. This institutional change points to more 
currency competition in the future72, despite the cur-
rent centrality of  the US.73 The interesting institutional 
feature of  these global monetary initiatives is that they 
are not established as international organizations, but 
rather as networks of  currency swaps (i.e. contracts).
Emerging powers are developing the same model 
of  cooperation established by advanced economies. I 
refer to temporary currency swaps established by the 
Fed after 2007, as well as the permanent and unlimited 
network announced in 2013. However, these structures 
carry more uncertainty in times of  crisis because swaps 
rely on national decisions for the transfer of  resources 
and central banks have national mandates and interests 
as priorities. Generally, swaps are three-year term rene-
wable contracts and limited to a certain value. Thus, this 
legal structure tends to create more transaction costs. It 
is also difficult to anticipate how the interplay between 
the three levels (multilateral, regional and bilateral) will 
take place in a crisis. Systemic risks and contagion can 
arise out of  this complex structure of  liquidity. In this 
sense, contested multilateralism can promote less cer-
tainty in the event of  an economic downturn.
Furthermore, this multifaceted network of  global 
liquidity is not horizontal. It is essentially hierarchical. 
Even if  new actors, such as G20 emerging countries, 
gained more power at the international level and are 
trying to internationalize their own currencies, they are 
still relying on international money issued by developed 
countries to build regional arrangements in the short 
and medium-term. Monetary governance reveals that 
institutional inertia is hard to overcome. The “interna-
tional hierarchy of  money”74 tends to be replicated in 
monetary arrangements, with a seemingly less impor-
tant role for international organizations at the multilate-
ral level (Figure 2).
72  EICHENGREEN, B. Exorbitant privilege: the rise and the fall 
of  the dollar and the future of  the International Monetary System, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
73  COHEN, B. J., BENNEY, T. M. What does the international 
currency system really look like?, Review of  International Political 
Economy v. 21, n.5, 2014.
74  BERNES, T. A., Jenkins, P., Mehrling, P., Neilson, D. China’s 
engagement…, 2015 (note 16, above).
Figure 2. The international hierarchy of  money
Source: Bernes et al. (2015)
Global liquidity in hard currencies from different 
sources is available to developed countries, emerging 
powers and less developed countries as a result of  the 
fragmentation of  the monetary system. Central banks 
gained more space to define their counterparties in 
swaps at the international level and can limit or expand 
the options for each country’s access to financial sup-
port in the event of  a crisis.
Multilateral institutions tend to play a less important 
role for emerging powers. They seem to prefer avoiding 
multilateral institutions and to rely on reserve accumu-
lation, or regional arrangements based on swaps for li-
quidity in traditional hard currencies. Since there is no 
international organization with a specific mandate, once 
a crisis hits, it can be difficult to assess the solvency of  
their counterparties and uncertainty tends to be greater. 
4. final Considerations
Despite G20 emerging powers’ efforts to change 
the global monetary landscape through voice and exit 
strategies, to date they have not caused significant chal-
lenges to the international monetary structure, but only 
incremental changes in the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Voice and representation reforms at the IMF merely se-
cured a symbolic power shift towards emerging powers. 
The US remains with its institutional veto power over 
the Fund’s key decisions.
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In addition, the parallel monetary arrangements 
created or reinforced by emerging powers in the 2008 
aftermath rely on the supply of  international money by 
the Fed and the permanence of  foreign exchange re-
serve accumulation, with its inherent economic costs. 
These regional structures are contributing to the frag-
mentation of  the global monetary system without gua-
ranteeing certain and timely access to liquidity in the 
event of  a crisis. They are based on currency swaps 
among central banks (i.e. national authorities), instead 
of  an international organization with specific global 
mandates. 
Currently, emerging powers and other developing 
countries seem to depend on the Chinese prospective, 
and to a lesser extent South Korean and Indian initiati-
ves, in assuring (1) new global currencies that could be 
used as an alternative to the US dollar and (2) new insti-
tutional providers (i.e. central banks) to assure liquidity 
backstops in times of  crisis. This is the model of  exit 
strategy, which could be more successful in challenging 
the actual framework of  the Bretton Woods system. 
Nonetheless, even if  a more multicurrency world emer-
ges in the future, the inherent hierarchical component 
of  a monetary order tends to persist. Some global cur-
rencies would be stronger than others. Monetary orders 
are hierarchical and at present seem to be more frag-
mented than they were prior to the 2008 crisis. Con-
tested multilateralism in monetary affairs may produce 
more uncertainty on how countries will respond to the 
next financial crisis.
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1  Shares prior to the entry in effect of  the ad hoc 
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